Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2004

Lara Young v. David Young : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Nancy A. Mismash; Kevin M. McDonough; Mismash & McDonough; LLC; Attorneys for
Petitioner/Appellee.
David Young; Pro Se.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Lara Young v. David Young, No. 20040227 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4858

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
_
DOCKET NO.
<®0HDZ2.-?

LARA YOUNG,
Appellee,
vs.
DAVID YOUNG,
Appellate Docket No. 20040227
Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE PETITIONER AND APPELLEE,
LARA YOUNG

APPEAL FROM RULING AND ORDER STAYING THE UTAH PROCEEDINGS
AND TRANSFERRING JURISDICTION TO KING COUNTY, STATE OF
WASHINGTON OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY, THE
HONORABLE BRUCE LUBECK

Nancy A. Mismash #6615
Kevin M. McDonough #5109
MISMASH & MCDONOUGH, LLC
136 South Main Street
Suite 404, Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Ph: 801-531-6088
Fax: 801-531-6093
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee
David Young
Appellant - Pro Se
P.O. Box 942
Park City, Utah 84060
Ph: 435-649-2197

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

DEC 0 6 2004

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LARA YOUNG,
Appellee,
vs.
DAVID YOUNG,
Appellate Docket No. 20040227
Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE PETITIONER AND APPELLEE,
LARA YOUNG

APPEAL FROM RULING AND ORDER STAYING THE UTAH PROCEEDINGS
AND TRANSFERRING JURISDICTION TO KING COUNTY, STATE OF
WASHINGTON OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY, THE
HONORABLE BRUCE LUBECK

Nancy A. Mismash #6615
Kevin M. McDonough #5109
MISMASH & MCDONOUGH, LLC
136 South Main Street
Suite 404, Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Ph: 801-531-6088
Fax: 801-531-6093
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee
David Young
Appellant - Pro Se
P.O. Box 942
Park City, Utah 84060
Ph: 435-649-2197

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
STATEMENT O F THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

2
2
2

B. Course of the Proceedings & Disposition of the Case

2

C. Statement of the Facts

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

7
9

I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT UTAH WAS AN
INCONVENIENT FORUM PURSUANT TO UCA § 78-45c-207

9

II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY STAYED THE UTAH PROCEEDINGS
PURSUANT TO UCA § 78-45c-202 AND DEFERRED THIS CASE TO THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON
12
CONCLUSION

13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

14

ADDENDUM

15

l

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Benson v. Benson, 667 N.W.2d 582 (N.D. 2003)
Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

7
1, 9, 10

Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

8

In Re T.M., 2003 UT App. 191, 73 P.3d 959
Statutes

8

Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3

1

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-201

8, 9, 12

Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-202

2, 9,12

Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-207

1, 2,4, 8, 9, 10

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a final order of a Utah
District Court may be appealed. Appellate jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court
of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(a) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court correctly stay the Utah proceedings based upon its

finding that, pursuant to UCA § 78-45c-207, Utah was an inconvenient forum?
2.

Did the trial court correctly order that the issues raised by the pending

petition to modify be considered by the Court in King County, State of Washington?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Challenges to the trial court's interpretation and application of statutory law
present questions of law: appellate review is for correctness, giving no particular
deference to the lower court's conclusions. In Re E.H.H., 2000 UT App 368, f 6, 16 P.3d
1257.
A pretrial jurisdictional issue decided by the trial court to determine the
appropriateness of exercising its continuing jurisdiction is a question of law and is
reviewed under a correction of error standard, giving no particular deference to the trial
courts determination. Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644, 646-647 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The determinative statutes cited herein are Utah Code Ann. §§ 7845c-202 and 78-45c-207 (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT O F THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a Ruling and Order of the Honorable Bruce Lubeck, Third
District Court, Summit County, State of Utah. Specifically, this is an appeal from the
Third District Court's Ruling and Order staying the proceedings in the State of Utah and
ordering that the matter be considered in the State of Washington.
B. Course of the Proceedings & Disposition of the Case
1.

On November 8,1995 Appellee, Lara Young, filed a Verified Divorce

Complaint seeking to terminate her marriage to Appellant, David Young, in Third
District Court, Summit County, State of Utah. (R. at 1-11).
2.

The case was tried on November 26, 1996. (R. at 155; 171).

3.

The Decree of Divorce was entered on March 24, 1997. (R. at 171 -178).

4.

Appellee, Lara Young filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and

Increase Child Support on August 12, 1998. (R. at 206-209).
5.

Appellant, David Young filed his Answer to the Petition to Modify Decree

of Divorce and Increase Child Support on August 28, 1998. (R. at 218-225).
6.

A trial on the Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce was held on October 7,

1998. (R. at 323.)
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7.

An Order Modifying Divorce Decree and Increasing Child Support was

issued on November 2, 1998. (R. at 323-324).
8.

Appellant, David Young, filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce on

May 5, 1999. (R. at 326-327).
9.

Appellee, Lara Young, filed her Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of

Divorce on June 17, 1999. (R. at 328-330).
10.

On July 19, 1999 Appellee, Lara Young, filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment or in The Alternative, Motion to Dismiss [Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce]. (R. 334-335).
11.

On November 2, 1999 the trial Court dismissed Appellant, David Young's,

Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce on the grounds that it was filed within six (6)
months of the Order Modifying Divorcee Decree and that, at the time of the hearing, no
genuine issue of material fact existed. (R. at 462-464).
12.

On April 3, 2000 Appellant, David Young, filed a second Petition to

Modify Decree of Divorce. (R. at 481-483).
13.

Appeellee, Laura Young, filed an Affidavit in Support of Motion to

Dismiss on September 29, 2000. (R. at 513- 516).
14.

Appellant's second Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce was dismissed on

or about June 12, 2001. (R. at 532)
15.

On June 30, 2003 Appellant, David Young, filed a third Petition to Modify

Decree of Divorce and Adoption of the Proposed Parenting Plan. (R. at 593-598).
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16.

On August 6, 2003 Appellee, Lara Young, filed a Petition for

Modification/Adjustment of Custody Decree/Parenting Plan/Residential Schedule in
King County Superior Court, State of Washington, Case No.: 03-3-09663 before the
Honorable Helen L. Halpert, seeking enforcement of the Order Modifying Divorce
Decree and Increasing Child Support as well as the remaining provisions of the Decree
of Divorce. (R. at 856-864).
17.

Appellant, David Young, filed an Answer to the Petition for

Modification/Adjustment of Custody Decree/Parenting Plan/Residential Schedule filed in
King County Superior Court, State of Washington. (R. at 968).
18.

On August 11, 2003 Appellee, Lara Young, filed a Motion to Quash on the

grounds that jurisdiction should be transferred to the State of Washington. (R. at 644646; 684-692).
19.

The Court heard oral arguments on Appellee, Lara Young's Motion to

Quash on November 17, 2003, at which time that matter was taken under advisement.
(R. at 964).
20.

Thereafter, on November 24, 2003 the Court discussed this matter with the

Honorable Helen Halpert, King County Superior Court, State of Washington. (R. at 965,
976).
21.

On November 25, 2004 the court issued its Ruling and Order and therein

held, "these proceedings are STAYED [ ] and the matter is to be considered in
Washington under petitioner's [Appellee's] petition to modify, the court finding this
[Utah] is an inconvenient forum under UCA § 78-45c-207." (R. at 970).
4

22.

This is an appeal from said final order granting Appellee, Lara Young's

Motion to Quash.
C. Statement of the Facts
1.

The parties are the parents of one minor child, to wit: Kayla MacKenzie

Young, (hereinafter "Kayla") born on January 25, 1995. (R. at 2, 156).
2.

This case was tried on November 26, 1996 and the Decree of Divorce was

entered on March 24, 1997. (R. at 155 - 170; 171-178).
3.

Pursuant to f 2 of the Decree of Divorce, the parties were awarded joint

legal custody of Kayla and Appellee, Lara Young, was designated as her physical
custodian. Appellant, David Young, was awarded liberal and reasonable visitation time
with Kayla. (R. at 172).
4.

In 1999 Appellee, Lara Young, was promoted by Gap, Inc. She and Kayla

relocated to the State of California. (R. at 648).
5.

In June 2002 Appellee, Lara Young, secured new employment at an

increased salary and relocated to the State of Washington. (R. at 648).
6.

Kayla has lived in the State of Washington since June 2002. (R. at 648).

7.

Kayla's contacts are in the State of Washington. Specifically, Kayla is

attending Carl Sandburg Elementary School: her schoolteachers and classmates are in
the State of Washington. Her current and ongoing medical care is provided in the State
of Washington: her pediatrician resides in the State of Washington. Kayla's babysitter
and after-school care providers are in the State of Washington. (R. at 648).
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8.

Since 1999, Appellant, David Young, has exercised visitation with Kayla

on approximately six (6) occasions. On these occasions, Kayla traveled to see Appellant
in the State of Utah. (R. at 647 - 648).
9.

Since Appellee, Lara Young, and Kayla left the State of Utah in 1999,

Appellant, David Young, has not traveled to either California or Washington see Kayla.
(R. at 647-648).
10.

Paragraph 3 of the Decree of Divorce order of Appellant, David Young, to

provide support of $136.00 per month for the benefit of Kayla. (R. at 173).
11.

Paragraph 1 of the Order Modifying Divorce Decree and Increasing Child

Support orders Appellant, David Young, to provide support of $589.00 per month for the
benefit of Kayla. (R. at 323).
12.

Appellant, David Young, has a child support arrearage of $5,219.55. (R. at

648, 682).
13.

On August 6, 2003 Appellee, Lara Young, filed an action in the State of

Washington, King County Superior Court, case number 03-3-09663-0 SEA before the
Honorable Helen L. Halpert, seeking enforcement of the Decree of Divorce and the Order
Modifying Divorce Decree. (R. at 686A; 856 - 864).
14.

Appellant, David Young, filed an Answer to the Petition for

Modification/Adjustment of Custody Decree/Parenting Plan/Residential Schedule filed in
King County Superior Court, State of Washington. (R. at 968).
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15.

This action and the action filed in King County Superior Court, State of

Washington are the only litigation which Appellee, Lara Young, has knowledge of
regarding custody of the parties' minor child. (R. at 649).
16.

Appellee, Lara Young currently has physical custody of Kayla: they reside

in the State of Washington. (R. at 649).
17.

The parties in this action are the only parties that claim custody or visitation

right with Kayla.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Adopted by Utah in 2000 as a complete replacement to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) "was promulgated in an effort to clarify ambiguous
provisions in the UCCJA and to rectify conflicting state interpretations of the UCCJA."
Benson v. Benson, 667 N.W.2d 582, 584 (N.D. 2003). "The most significant changes in
the UCCJEA are prioritizing home-state jurisdiction and providing for exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction in the initial decree state." IcL
Specifically, Section 202 of the UCCJEA clears up the confusion that was being
caused by the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. §1738A. Codified
as Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-202. The "PKPA requires other States to give full faith and
credit to custody determinations made by the original decree State pursuant to the decree
State's continuing jurisdiction so long as that State has jurisdiction under its own law and
remains the residence of the child or any contestant." See UCCJEA, §202, comment 2,
Appellant Brief Addendum B.
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Section 207 of the UCCJEA "retains the focus of Section 7 of the UCCJA. It
authorizes courts to decide that another State is in a better position to make the custody
determination, taking into consideration the relative circumstances of the parties. If so,
the court may defer to the other state." See UCCJEA, §207, cmt, Appellant Brief,
Addendum B; codified at Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-207, citing 78-45c-7 (Repealed
2000). However, there is one significant departure from the UCCJA: "the court shall
stay the case and direct the parties to file in the State that has been found to be the more
convenient forum. The court is also authorized to impose any other conditions it
considers appropriate." See UCCJEA, §207, cmts, Appellant Brief] Addendum B.
In this case, §§ 202 and 207 of the UCCJEA were correctly applied by the trial
court as the applicable body of law governing this situation. First, the respondent filed a
petition on June 30, 2003 to modify the decree after the UCCJEA statutory changes were
adopted by Utah in 2000. Even if the filing date is determined to be the date of the
divorce, November 8, 1995, the UCCJEA still applies because the applicable sections at
issue in this case are procedural in nature, and can be applied retroactively. "A statute
may be applied retroactively if it affects only procedural and not substantive rights." In
Re T.M., 2003 UT App. 191, f 17, 73 P.3d 959, quoting Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Second, a court of this State conducted an initial child custody determination.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-201. Pursuant to f 2 of the Decree of Divorce, Appellee was
granted the care, custody, and control of the party's minor child, Kayla. (R. 172). Based
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on the initial child custody determination, this court has exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. 78-45c-202.
Pursuant to the UCCJEA as adopted by Utah, the trial court continues to have
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction until a court of this state determines that "neither the
child, the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a
significant connection with this state.. .or.. .the court determines that it is an inconvenient
forum." Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-202(l-2).
In this case, a Utah court has determined that there lacks a significant connection
with this state, and that Utah is an inconvenient forum. (R. at 970). In making this
determination, the Court discussed the case with the Honorable Helen L. Halpert, King
County Superior Court, Washington, to determine whether Washington state "ought to
have matters heard [] because its inconvenient or because there's no substantial
connection with this state." (R. at 976). After a considerable discussion on the record,
the Court determined that "it's inconvenient... [and] there simply isn't sufficient
connection [in Utah] anymore to justify keeping it here, and I can allow it to go forward
[in Washington]. (R. at 976).
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT UTAH WAS AN
INCONVENIENT FORUM PURSUANT TO UCA § 78-45c-207.

Under the UCCJEA, a "Utah court may choose to decline to exercise its
jurisdiction, stay its proceedings, and defer to the jurisdiction of [another states court]."
Liska at 648. Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, the court
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shall consider all relevant factors, including: .. .[1] the length of time the
child has resided outside this state; [2] the distance between the court in this
state and the court in the State that would assume jurisdiction; [3] the
relative financial circumstances of the parties; [4] any agreement of the
parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction; [5] the nature and
location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including
the testimony of the child; [6] the ability of the court of each state to decide
the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the
evidence; and [7]the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and
issues of the pending litigation.
See also Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-207.
In Liska, the commissioner "properly" recommended "that Utah decline to
exercise its primary jurisdiction and defer to the jurisdiction of the Colorado court."
Liska at 649-650. The commissioner found "evidence that is available to the Colorado
court regarding the children's schooling, medical care, psychological evaluation, family
and peer relationships is not available to this court." Id. Furthermore, "[b]ased on the
continued residency of the children in Colorado.. .and the limited visitation exercised by
the noncustodial parent who resides in Utah, Colorado has a close connection with the
children at present." Id.
The Liska considerations mandate that the State of Utah stay its case and defer the
case to the State of Washington. Kayla's contacts are in the State of Washington.
Indeed, Kayla left the State of Utah in 1999 and has not returned. (R. at 648). All
current and relevant evidence necessary to determine her best interest is present in the
State of Washington. Namely, Kayla's records for day care, preschool, and elementary
school are in the State of Washington. Her friends, care takers, and health care providers
reside in the State of Washington. (R. at 648). And, contrary to Appellant's position,
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Kayla's infrequent contact with the State of Utah - six (6) visits over the last five (5)
years - does not provide the basis necessary for the State of Utah to retain jurisdiction.
(R. at 647-648).
Without dispute, Washington is of a sufficient distance that requiring Appellee,
Lara Young, and Kayla, and all required witness to travel to Utah, is considerably more
inconvenient, and expensive than requiring one witness, Appellant, David Young, travel
to the State of Washington. The financial burden is of significance in this case in that
Appellant, David Young, has failed and refused to remain current in his child support
obligation. His arrearage is $5,219.55. (R. at 648, 682). Notwithstanding Appellant's
child support arrearages, Appellee, Lara Young, has provided consistent and reliable
financial support for Kayla. To now require her to incur additional financial strain in
travel expenditures and time off of work to come to Utah would be inequitable and
unfair. Moreover, because the original Decree is silent as to the issue of retained
jurisdiction, principals of equity and fairness should control.
Finally, King County Superior Court has a family court division/department, such
that the necessary evaluations can occur more quickly and with less expense than in Utah.
Therefore, King County Superior Court is able to decide the issues more expeditiously.
(R. at 976). And, while it is true the State of Utah has maintained this action since 1995,
the relevant and necessary evidence regarding the best interest of Kayla is not longer
available in the State of Utah. Indeed, the State of Utah's only claim to the case is based
on the case's history. This is not and should not be the basis of jurisdiction. Without

11

dispute, the State of Washington is a more convenient forum notwithstanding that it will
have to become familiar with the procedural and factual history of this case.
Based on the forgoing factors, Utah is clearly the inconvenient forum in this
matter. Therefore, in accordance with the UCCJEA purpose to "promote cooperation
with the courts of other States to the end that a custody decree is rendered in the State
which can best decide the case in the best interest of the child," the Utah court correctly
stayed these proceedings, allowing Washington to exercise jurisdiction consistent with
Appellee, Lara Young's Petition to Modify. See. UCCJEA, §101, cmt. (2), Appellant
Brief, Addendum B.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY STAYED THE UTAH
PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO UCA § 78-45c-202 AND DEFERRED
THIS CASE TO THE STATE OF WASHINGTON.

A court of this state that has made an initial child custody determination has
exclusive and continuing jurisdiction to modify the child custody determination unless
the court "determines that neither the child, the child and one parent, nor the child and
person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state and that substantial
evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's care, protection,
training, and personal relationships." Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-201, 202.
The trial court in this case found that there no longer existed substantial evidence
in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
"[Kayla] has been in Washington since June, 2002.. .any records concerning the child in
Utah would be at least 4 years old and the child is not yet nine years of age... [and] that
the best interest of the child" is to stay the proceedings in Utah in favor of Washington.
12

(R. at 976). Further, there lacks any significant connection with Utah since Kayla has
only returned to Utah six times to visit Respondent. (R. at 647-648).
Based on the aforementioned analysis by the trial court, Utah lacks any substantial
evidence concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
Moreover, "the relationship between the child and the person remaining in the State with
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction [is] so attenuated" that there no longer exists a
substantial connection sufficient to warrant a court of this State to enforce jurisdiction.
See UCCJEA, §202, cmt. 1, Appellant Brief, Addendum B.

Therefore, the trial court

correctly stayed these proceedings, allowing Washington to exercise jurisdiction over the
petitioner's petition to modify.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Appellee, Lara Young prays that this Court uphold the Ruling and
Order of the trial court staying any further action in the State of Utah on Appellant's
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and Adoption of the Proposed Parenting Plan on
the grounds that the State of Utah is an inconvenient forum to determine or otherwise
decide the issues presented therein and that the matter should be deferred to the State of
Washington.
DATED this ^ _ day of December, 2004.

Nancy Mismash
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Petitioner and Appellee, was deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid on this
[0

day of December, 2004.
David Young
Appellant - Pro Se
P.O. Box 942
Park City, Utah 84060
Ph: 435-649-2197
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit A

Utah Code Annotated § 78-45c-202

Exhibit B

Utah Code Annotated § 78-45c-207

Exhibit C

Transcript of Chambers/Telephonic Hearing

Exhibit D

Ruling and Order
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A

Utah Code Annotated § 78-45c-202
Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45C-204, a court of this state that
has made a child custody determination consistent with Section 78-45c-201 or 7845c-203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
(a) a court of this state determines that neither the child, the child and one parent,
nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with
this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state
concerning the childfs care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(b) a court of this state or a court of another state determines that neither the child,
nor a parent, nor any person acting as a parent presently resides in this state.
(2) A court of this state that has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this
section may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the court determines that it is an
inconvenient forum under Section 78-45c-207.

(3) A court of this state that has made a child custody determination and does not
have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that
determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under
Section 78-45C-201.
Laws 2000, c. 247, $ 14, eff. July 1. 2000.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 202 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (1997). See Volume 9, Pt. IA Uniform Laws Annotated, Master
Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.

B

Utah Code Annotated § 78-45c-207
Inconvenient forum

(1) A court of this state that has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a child
custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it
determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a
court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient
forum may be raised upon the court's own motion, request of another court, or
motion of a party.
(2) Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this state
shall consider whether it is appropriate that a court of another state exercise
jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit
information and shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(a) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future
and which state could best protect the parties and the child;
(b) the length of time the child has resided outside this state;
(c) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would
assume jurisdiction;
(d) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(e) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
(f) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending
litigation, including the testimony of the child;
(g) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the
procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(h) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues of the pending
litigation.
(3) If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a
court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the proceedings
upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly commenced in
another designated state and may impose any other condition the court considers
just and proper.

(4) A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter
if a child custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another
proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.

Laws 2000, c. 247. $ 19, cff. July 1, 2000.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 207 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (1997). See Volume 9, Pt. IA Uniform Laws Annotated, Master
Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw.
Prior Laws:
Laws 1980, c. 41.
C. 1953, § 78-45c-7.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LARA YOUNG,
Plaintiff,

) Case No. 954600158

vs

)

DAVID YOUNG,

Transcript of:
CHAMBERS/TELEPHONIC HEARING

Defendant.

)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE BRUCE LUBECK

Silver Summit District Court
6300 North Silver Creek Drive
Park City, UT 84098

X>\AfL)cflft£

NOVEMBER 24, 2003

TRANSCRIBED BY: ED MIDGLEY
238-7533

A P P E A R A N C E S

HONORABLE BRUCE LUBECK
Third District Court, Summit County
State of Utah
Silver Summit District Court
6300 North Silver Creek Drive
Park City, UT 84098
Appearing in Utah Chambers

HONORABLE HELEN L. HALPERT
King County Superior Court
State of Washington
c/o 516 3rd Ave Rm W-1034
Seattle, WA 98122
Appearing Telephonically from Washington
MR. HANSEN, Esquire
for the Plaintiff in Washington
Appearing Telephonically from Washington

•

*

•

(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in
open court:)

JUDGE LUBECK:
may.

Let me put you on speaker, too, if I

Are you there, Judge?
JUDGE HALPERT:

Yes, and in court with me is Mr.

Hansen, who represents the mother in Washington; is that
correct?
MR. HANSEN:

That's correct.

JUDGE LUBECK:
record.

All right, let me -- I!11 just make my

I am in my office; no one is here.

And I have a

digital recording system, so that's why I ! ve put you on
speakerphone.

But no one's here.

But it will only record in

that way.
And if I may, just for the record in this case, it's
Lara Young versus David Young, Case Number 954600158.

And in

the case here, if I may, the Respondent, Mr. Young, has filed a
motion to -- petition to modify the decree that was entered
back in 1997.

There have actually been a couple of petitions,

in '98 and '99, and 2000.

But this is one that was filed June

30 of this year here in Summit County.
And he requested temporary orders, and I've had a
hearing scheduled for August 11.

And on that very date, the

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the summons and asked,
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erroneously, under the "UCCJA," that this matter be handled up
there in Washington.

And I —

we didn't do anything on the

11th because we just got her pleading that day, and I allowed
Mr. Young to respond.

He's done that.

We then had a hearing last week, or a couple of weeks
ago, on November 17, and I talked to Judge Halpert off the
record just about scheduling this hearing.
And we scheduled this to discuss, under the UCCJEA,
whether or not this state, being -- having original, exclusive
jurisdiction, ought to have matters heard up there because it's
inconvenient or because there's no substantial connection with
this state.
So, as I see it, from this perspective, Judge, that's
where we are, and the purpose of this conversation.
JUDGE HALPERT:

I would agree there is —

I don't

Mr. Hansen doesn't know if this is his problem or not.

—

He

wrote me a letter, which I got Friday, which explains Mom's
position.

I believe I asked that it also be faxed to you; I

think my bailiff might have done that.
JUDGE LUBECK:
JUDGE HALPERT:

Yes.

And I did receive that.

But Mr. Hansen was relying on Utah

counsel to serve Mr. Young and we had no idea whether that
happened.
JUDGE LUBECK:

Correct.

I don't have anything that

indicates whether it did or didn't.
4

MR. HANSEN:

(Inaudible)

JUDGE HALPERT:

So, having said that, had Mr. Young

had notice of this, he could have been in your court; correct?
JUDGE LUBECK:
this.

No.

He didn ? t have notice from us of

No, I didn't intend for either party to be here, to be

part of this; at least I didn f t set it up that way.

If you

think it should be, we can do that, but no, he did not have
notice of this, and to my knowledge neither did Lara Young!s
attorney here in Utah.
JUDGE HALPERT:

What —

this is how I construe the

case: that in fact Utah does have continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction as a matter of law, but that the child lives in
Washington and it makes much more sense to do the action here,
on a forum-inconvenient basis.
JUDGE LUBECK:

Is that

No, I mean and that ! s, as I see under

the law, what we ! re talking about.
these here.

—

Again, we don ! t do a lot of

This is a county outside of Salt Lake, and we have

a lot of divorces, but Irm not experienced in these, these
UCCJEA things.
evidently —

But yes, that!s the situation.

She

I think it f s pretty clear that the mother and the

child left Utah, and I'm not exactly sure when, but at some
point in 1999.

So, they've been gone at least four and perhaps

pushing five years, depending on when they left.
The father was here and has remained here; has been
here for 27 years or something.

And so his filings, which are
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voluminous and long, are to the extent that she, the mother,
has just been moving around.

The fact that she's in Washington

now is a mere fortuity -- this is his position; I'm not
advocating it —

that she moves around for work and for

boyfriends and just happened to have landed in Washington
because a boyfriend is there now, and she is as likely to leave
next week as she is next month, and that's basically his
position; being sort of casual about it.
That she's lived in five jurisdictions —

four

jurisdictions in five years, and there are sufficient ties here
to do it.
Clearly, she I believe at age 4 didn't go to school
here and hasn't been here since 1999.
there's no question about that.

And, really, I think

So, whatever school records

there are certainly aren't going to be here, and I don't know
what may be there.

I understand from the pleadings she's been

there since June of 2002, so about a year and-a-half, and I
assume the child is in school there.

I don't know what else

would be there, other than school records; and the bodies, of
course.
JUDGE HALPERT:

Certainly, from my perspective, it

would be easier to do it here since the child is here, because
an evaluator could spend some time observing the child; a
parenting evaluator.
JUDGE LUBECK:

Right.
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JUDGE HALPERT:
this.

So, I don't know what your call is on

I would be perfectly happy to retain this case and to

have Utah decide to bow out on this one.

But I do think, as a

matter of law, it is your call, Judge Lubeck.
JUDGE LUBECK:
agree with that.

Well, again, I want to make sure you

That's, frankly, the way I see it.

decide that it's either -- like I say —
—

I can

it's inconvenient, or

and maybe it's not completely separate, but in my mind

they're kind of separate —

but there simply isn't sufficient

connection here anymore to justify keeping it here, and I can
allow it to go forward there.
So, if you agree with that, I'm not sure that —
be glad to talk to them —
decision.

I'll

but I just need to make that

And I would -- I think, frankly, I would prefer to

re-read the statutes to make sure I'm on solid footing.
But is there anything else that you can think of that
would weigh in to this decision, where this ought to happen?
JUDGE HALPERT:

I think the key is, I saw the

pleadings that Mom filed in Utah.

We do have —

what your evaluation services are in Utah.

I don't know

King County, we

have quite good family court services, and there could be a
low-cost evaluation done here.

And you all may have that, too.

But that's just another factor.
JUDGE LUBECK:
JUDGE HALPERT:

So, you are a family court?
Yes.
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JUDGE LUBECK:
general jurisdiction.
the county.

Okay.

And I ! m not; I!m a court of

I do everything here; the only judge in

But we do indeed have a large number of

evaluators, but they —

it's just a question of normally the

parties agree, and, if they don't, the court selects one, and
we have a rule that sets the time limits and so on.
competitive market and so it's really a —

there isn't a —

wouldn't say that many of them are low cost.
little bit.

But it's a
I

But they vary a

But they're reasonably expensive.

So, it may be that you have a better system in place.
I don't think ours is deficient in any way, but I think a
family court —

we don't have a family court in Utah at all.

But it's my understanding that that would probably be better
than what we have.
JUDGE HALPERT:

I do want to clarify:

King County

Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction.
JUDGE LUBECK:
JUDGE HALPERT:

Right.

But you have a

—

Administratively, we divide up, and

my assignment at this point is family court for two years.
JUDGE LUBECK:
was.

Okay.

Good.

That's what I assumed it

Okay.
JUDGE HALPERT:

So, are you just going to issue a

written order; is that your
JUDGE LUBECK:

—

I think that's — i n

this, I think I'd

rather have that record, and just do a brief minute entry, a
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ruling and order with the background and say Ifm going to keep
it here or send it there, and get that to you in the next day
or so.

I!m not sure that we have a mailing address, but I

imagine our clerks have exchanged fax numbers or something.
But

—
JUDGE HALPERT:
JUDGE LUBECK:

Why donf t you get that to us .
All right.

And I f 11 just do a ruling

and order saying it seems to me that it f s better that it go one
place or the other and do that.

And, again, I won f t delay on

that; I'm sure I can get that out in the next day or two.
JUDGE HALPERT:
JUDGE LUBECK:

That would be great.
All right.

appreciate this time with you.

Anything else, Judge?

I

Anything else you think we need

to talk about?
JUDGE HALPERT:
case.

I don't think it's a legally hard

I mean, I don't think Mr. Hansen is arguing that

Washington be the home state for modification; he's arguing
that it makes more sense to have it here, but not —

I don't

think anyone disagrees as to what the law is, and that it is
your choice.
JUDGE LUBECK:
JUDGE HALPERT:
JUDGE LUBECK:
JUDGE HALPERT:
JUDGE LUBECK:

Okay.
Thank you very much.
Very well.

Thank you, Judge.

Bye.
Bye.
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(Whereupon, the instant proceedings came to a close.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Ed Midgley, an Official Court Reporter in and for
the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing
proceedings, recorded via digital audio at the time of their
occurrence, were subsequently reduced by me, incident to
assignment, to printed transcript form as hereinbefore
appearing;
That I was not present at any of the proceedings
hereinbefore represented/.
But that said transcription, so reduced, constitutes
a true and correct transcription of testimony given, evidence
adduced and/or proceedings had as appearing upon said digital
audio record, to the best of my ability so to transcribe.
To which certification I hereby set my hand this 3rd
day of December, 2003, at Sa]

Ed Midgley

Ol/iAVruJc,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LARA YOUNG,
RULING and ORDER
Petitioner,
Case No. 954600158
vs.
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK
DAVID YOUNG,
Respondent.

DATE: November 25, 200 3

The above matter came before the court on November 17, 2003
for oral argument on Petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner was
present through Nancy Mismash, and Respondent was present without
counsel, representing himself.
BACKGROUND
The parties in this case were divorced March 25, 1997. One
child was"born to the parties in 1995. There were several
petitions to modify. A petition to modify was filed August 12,
1998 by petitioner. A petition to modify was filed May 5, 1999,
by respondent. Respondent filed another petition on April 3,
2000. The parties have been given joint physical custody.
On June 30, 2003, respondent filed this petition to modify
the decree, seeking custody, alleging petitioner has created an
unstable environment for the child, with petitioner moving
several times, living in 4 jurisdictions in the past 5 years. He
supported it with a lengthy affidavit setting forth petitioner's
moves, residences, vehicles, boyfriends, and other information
about her alleged instability. He asserts she moved to
Washington in June, 2002, where she remains, after having left
Utah with the child in 1999, thence to California, thence to
Washington in June, 2002. He filed a proposed parenting plan as
well, and sought temporary relief. A hearing was scheduled and
held August 11, 2003.
On August 1, 2003, petitioner filed a motion in King County,
Washington, to modify custody, arguing that Washington was the
home state of the child and Washington should entertain the
petition and child custody issues. On a date unknown, respondent
in this action filed a response in Washington.
On August 11, 2003, petitioner filed the present motion to
quash arguing that under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction

Act (UCCJA) this court did not have jurisdiction, but that the
matter should be heard in Washington. The court continued the
matter to allow respondent to respond, which he did with
supporting attachments on September 11, 2003. Petitioner filed
no reply but filed a notice to submit September 15, 2003. Oral
argument was held November 17, 2003.
The court determined that the UCCJEA, rather than the UCCJA
as asserted by petitioner, is the applicable body of law
governing this situation. The court ruled that it would take the
matter under advisement and contact the court in Washington and
then make a ruling as to whether Utah should retain jurisdiction
or whether it should find this an inconvenient forum because
there were no substantial ties to Utah with the child and one
parent being in another state. The court contacted the Honorable
Helen Halpert on November 17, 2003. The off-the-record
conversation was solely and exclusively about identifying the
case in each jurisdiction and the parties, and scheduling a
future discussion for an on-the-record discussion. The merits of
the cases were not discussed in any manner.
It was determined
that the clerks of the two courts would talk in the next couple
of days and schedule a time convenient for both courts when a
recorded discussion could take place. On November 18, 2003, that
discussion was scheduled for Nove'mber 24, 2003.
The court has now discussed the matter with the Honorable
Helen Halpert on the record. That conversation will be ordered
transcribed and provided to the parties as soon as available.
DISCUSSION
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the
entire file, and heard oral argument, concludes as follows.
Under the UCCJEA, UCA 78-45c-101 et.seq., this court has
continuing exclusive jurisdiction until this court determines
there is not a significant connection with Utah and that
substantial evidence is no longer available in this state
concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal
relationships. If this court so determines it has exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction, it may also decline jurisdiction if it
determines this is an inconvenient forum. UCA 78-45c-202. This
state is inconvenient if another state is more appropriate forum,
and the court shall consider all relevant factors, including
those listed in UCA 78-45c-207, which include prior domestic
violence, the length of time the child has resided outside of
Utah, the distance between this court and Washington's court, the
relative financial circumstances of the parties, any agreement of
the parties, the nature and location of the evidence required to
resolve the pending litigation (including testimony of the

child), the ability of the court of each state to decide the
issue expeditiously, and the familiarity of the court of each
state with the facts and issues of the pending litigation. If
this court determines it is an inconvenient forum, it may stay
this proceeding on condition that the child custody proceeding
proceed in Washington.
Thus, the court believes there are two reasons why it could
decline jurisdiction. The first is under 78-45c-202, if the
court concludes there are not sufficient connection with this
state and substantial evidence is no longer available here. The
second and distinct reason it may decline jurisdiction is because
the court finds the forum inconvenient, after weighing the
statutory factors.
In this case the parties were married in this jurisdiction
in 1992, and one child was born in Utah in 1995. The parties
divorced in 1997. The mother, petitioner, and the child moved
from Utah in 1999 to California, and now live in Washington.
Respondent has remained in Utah. Respondent has evidently
attempted more involvement in the life of his daughter. He
claims petitioner is unstable in residence, employment, and
relationship and the child's best interest is for both parents to
be in this jurisdiction under an agreed parenting plan.
The child was not in school before she left Utah in 1999,
being only 4 years old at that time. It is not in the record
exactly what schools she has been attending, when she started,
nor where all the records are. She has been in Washington since
June, 2002.
Overall, the court believes that the proceedings in this
jurisdiction should be stayed while the matter proceeds in
Washington. The child is there, and though the UCCJEA does not
reflect that the best interest of the child is a weighty
consideration, it is to this court. The court in Washington has
a family court division or department and evaluations can occur
more quickly and with less expense than in Utah. Any records
concerning the child in Utah would be at least 4 years old and
the child is not yet nine years of age. Travel to Utah by the
mother and child is more inconvenient than travel to Washington
by one person, respondent.
These proceedings are STAYED in Utah and the matter is to be
considered in Washington under petitioner's petition to modify,
the court finding this is an inconvenient forum under UCA 78-45c207.
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other

order is required.
DATED this

day o f _ y _ V

_ , 2003.
BY THE COURT:
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